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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16198 
ALFRED BENNIE WILSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant appeals from a jury verdict finding 
him guilty of the offense of robbery, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1953), as amended. After the appellant 
had taken this appeal, he located an additional witness 
allegedly able to corroborate the defense of alibi raised 
at trial. Appellant's petition for a writ of coram nobis 
was dismissed by the trial court. All proceedings were 
presided over by the Honorable George E. Ballif, District 
Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN THE L01i'JER COURT 
The appellant was tried before a jury by the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, was found guilty of the offense of robbery, 
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and was sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah state Prison 
for an i'ndeterminate term of from one to fifteen yearn. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the conviction 
in the court below, as well as an affirmance of the order 
dismissing the appellant's petition for a writ of coram 
nobis for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of June 29, 1978, appellant entered 
a Texaco Service Station owned by one Leo Carter, struck 
the service station attendant, Jared Harper, twice on the 
head,.and while Mr. Harper feigned unconsciousness, robbed 
the establishment of approximately $143.00 (T. 17, 18, 19, 
51). Mr. Harper testified that the crime occurred at 
about 9:55p.m. (T. 16), and that he recognized the 
appellant as a person who had entered the station office 
earlier; about 8:00 to 8:30p.m. (T. 15). At the earlier 
encounter, the victim and the appellant conversed for two 
or three minutes while the latter looked at car seats in 
the office (T. 35). At the time of the commission of the 
crime, the appellant asked Mr. Harper for change for the 
pop machine and gave him a dollar bill to change (T. 17). 
As the victim turned to the cash register, he was hit 
on the head twice from behind and fell to the floor (T. 17, 18). 
-2-
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He remained onthe floor, though conscious, until the 
appellant left and then telephonedthepolice (T. 20). 
When the police arrived, Officer Berhow asked 
Mr. Harper to describe the person who committed the 
crime. Harper described a male of medium height and build 
with dark hair parted in the middle, a beard and moustache, 
wearing a red pullover t-shirt and faded Levis {T. 65). 
The following day, June 30, 1978, Mr. harper met with 
Officer Berhow and gave him the same description as ·he had 
given the previous evening {T. 67). He participated in 
the construction of a composite drawing (T. 56-57). A 
photocopy of the composite was made by the officer and the 
original was dismantled (T. 58). 
Soon after this process was completed, Officer 
Berhow presented eight photographs to Mr. Harp~r, who picked 
out a photograph of the appellant, whom he identified as the 
perpetrator of the robbery (T. 60). At the trial itself, 
which occurred on November 21, 22, 1978, the victim again 
identified the appellant (T. 14) as the person with whom 
he had conversed for two or three minutes between 8:00 and 
8:30 p.m., and who had returned to the station at about 
10:00 p.m asking fo~ change when the robbery and assault 
-3-
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occurred. Mr. Harper testified that on the latter occasion 
he was able to see the appellant's face for six to ten 
seconds (T. 35). 
At the trial, the appellant raised the defense of 
alibi and introduced witnesses who testified that he was 
elsewhere than the scene of the crime at the time it was 
alleged to have occurred (T. 81,89,97,107,127). Long 
after the time for moving for a new trial had expired, 
appellant petitioned for a writ of coram nobis on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence, which petition was 
dismissed by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE STATE OF 
UTAH WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
AND JUDGMENT OF GUILT. 
The evidence produced by the state in this case. 
was legally sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. 
The state showed through the testimony of its witness 
that the robbery did in fact occur and that appellant was 
beyond a reasonable doubt the perpetrator of the crime. 
The testimony of Hr. Harper was weighed by the jury against 
that of five defense witnesses who testified as to the 
abibi defense, and in the excercise of the discretion 
-4-
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'- j 4J 44 <" 
allowed to it to determine the weight of evidence and 
credibility of witnesses, the jury rejected the testimony 
of the defense witnesses and returned a verdict of guilty. 
This Court has consistently recognized that 
judging the credibility of witnesses and weight of the 
evidence is the exclusive prerogative of the jury and 
that the jury's verdict must stand unless it clearly appears 
that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory 
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubts 
that the crime was committed. Thus, in State v. Wilson, 565 
P.2d 66 (Utah 1977~,this Court, in affirming a conviction 
for distribution of a controlled substance, stated: 
[w]e are obliged to assume that the 
jury believed those aspects of the 
evidence, and drew those inferences 
that reasonably could be drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the 
verdict. In order for the defendant 
to successfully challenge and overturn a 
verdict on the ground of insufficiency of 
the evidence, it must appear that upon 
so viewing the evidence reasonable minds 
must necessarily entertain a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime. 
565 P.2d 66, 68. [See also, State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 
292, 422 P.2d 196 (1967); State v. Allgood, 28 Utah 2d 119, 
499 P.2d 269 (1972); and State v. Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 
p. 2d 14 6 ( 19 6 0) . J 
This court has also held that on appeal from a criminal 
conviction it will view the testimony as a whole in the 
-5-
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light most favorable to the state. State v •. Jones, 
554 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1976); State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 
466 (Utah 1975); State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 498 
P.2d 357 (1972). 
Appellant's sole ground for declaring that 
the evidence in this case was insufficient to convict 
the appellant is that since Mr. Harper had only a short 
time to observe his assailant and appellant introduced 
alibi witnesses, under no circumstances could the jury 
have failed to find a reasonable doubt that appellant 
committed the offense. A rational assessment of this 
case indicates no such compelling necessity for the 
jury to have found a reasonable doubt of the identity 
of appellant with the perpetrator. 
First, Jared Harper had more than a fleeting 
glance of his attacker. He had seen and talked to the 
person face to face for two or three minutes earlier 
in the evening, and at the time of the attack he had 
another six to ten second look at his face--sufficient 
to convince him that it was the same person who entered 
the office earlier (T.l5,35). The contact between the 
two at this later time took place in a well-lighted 
office and was sufficiently close to allow the transfer 
from appellant to Mr. Harper of a dollar bill (T.l7). 
-6-
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Even aftpr ~.tng struck on the head, Mr. Harper was 
able to give to police a coherent description of his 
assailant that evening and the following day, while 
his recollection was still fresh, and he was able to pick 
from similar photographs that of the appellant whom 
he identified as the perpetrator of the attack (T.65, 
67,60). He was further able to identify the appellant 
at trial (T.l4). A reasonable mind could believe from 
this evidence that the appellant was guilty. 
Thus, only if the jury must have believed the 
testimony of the defense witnesses as to the alleged 
alibi, would the appellant be able to successfully 
challenge the verdict upon insufficiency of the evidence 
grounds, State v. Wilson, id. at 68. Appellant's defense 
of alibi was allegedly established by the testimony of 
appellant and four other witnesses who each testified that 
appellant either could not have been at the station at 
8:00-8:30 p.m. or could not have been there at 10:00 p.m. 
when the crime was committed (T.81,89,97,107,127). All 
of these witnesses were subject to challenqe for bias in 
favor of appellant, being his father, mother, brother, and 
close friend. The prosecutor, Mr. Esplin, also established 
on cross-examination of these witnesses, a likelihood that 
their testimony was in part the result, not of independent 
personal recollection, but of collaboration and fabrication 
-7-
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between the witnesses at a meeting in at~o~~p counsel's 
office. An instance of this was revealed in the testimony 
of Mr. Powell, appellant's friend, to the effect that in 
the meeting he suggested that appellant was wearing a 
white shirt on the night of the crime (although Mr. 
Harper had identified the perpetrator as wearing a red 
shirt), and that no one else had any independent 
recollection of this (T.ll7). Nevertheless, all but 
one defense witness testified at trial that appellant 
was wearing a white shirt (T.82,99,117,130). 
Based on this impeaching cross-examination, 
there was nothing to mandate that the jury believe the 
defense witnesses, but such decision was properly left 
to thei.r sole discretion to weigh credibility. Appellant 
has failed to meet the heavy burden of proving insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the conviction of appellant. 
POINT II. 
THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE 
APPELLA!TT 'tJAS NOT IMPER11ISSIBLY INDUCED 
BY EXTERNAL INFLUENCES, BUT VJAS THE RESULT 
OF THE \'JITNESS'S INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION. 
Appellant challenges the participation of the 
state's witness, Mr. Harper, in the process of constructing 
a composite drawing as having been impermissibly suggestive 
in the process of identifying the appellant. Appellant 
argues, briefly, that the composite drawing was the product 
-8-
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of Mr. "Harper's impaired memory and that his participation 
'in its construction made it inevitable that the witness 
would pick appellant's photograph in the photo display 
and that appellant would be identified by Mr. Harper at 
trial. Appellant's counsel failed to object to Mr. 
Harper's in-court identification of appellant (T.l4). 
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 4: 
A verdict or finding shall not be 
set aside, nor shall the judgment or 
decision based thereon be reversed, by 
reason of the erroneous admission of 
evidence unless (a) there appears of 
record objection to the evidence timely 
interposed and so stated as to make 
clear the specific ground for objection. 
Unless this Court finds plain error in the admission by 
the trial court of such evidence, the trial court's ruling 
on admissibility does not present a ground for reversal. 
State v. Smith, 45 Utah 381, 146 Pac. 286 (1915); State v. 
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Stovall v. 
Denno, 388 u.s. 293 (1967), and Sim.'11ons v. United States, 
390 u.s. 377 (1967), has delineated the test which appellant 
must meet to show that his due process rights were violated 
by the identification process. The Stovall case involved an 
allegedly impermissible identification by the victim 
while she was near death in the hospital in which the 
-9-
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defendant was the only person presented to be identified. 
The court held that under the extreme circumstances, this 
"lineup of one" was permissible. In Simmons, defendant 
was identified from photographs by bank employees the day 
after the robbery of the bank. The Court stated the 
applicable test as follows: 
[C]onvictions based on eyewitness 
identification at trial following a pretrial 
identification by photograph will be set 
aside on that ground (suggestiveness) only 
if the photographic identification procedure 
was so impermissibly suggestive as to give 
rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable misidentification. 
390 u.s. 377, 384. 
In findinq no violation present, the court looked 
at the fact that the witnesses observed the defendant in good 
conditions for up to five minutes, that they made the 
identification the following day while their recollection 
was still fresh, and that photographic identification was 
necessary because the perpetrator was still at large. 
This Court adopted the Stovall and Sin~ons test 
in State v. Wettstein, 28 Utah 2d 295, 501 P.2d 1084 (1972), 
in which the defendant was convicted of robbery based upon 
an in-court identification which was allegedly tainted by 
an improperly suggestive photo display. In finding that 
even though defendant's picture was the only one within the 
-10-
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group which depicted a man with a moustache, in the 
circumstances this was not impermissibly suggestive, 
The Court stated: 
In Stovall v. Denno, 388 u.s. 293 
(1967) the court stated that a claimed 
violation of due process of law in the 
conduct of a confrontation depends on 
the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding it. The question to be resolved 
is whether the suggestive elements in the 
identification procedure made it all but 
inevitable that the witness would identify 
defendant, whether or not he was, in fact, 
''the man." In Simmons v. United States, 
388 U.S. 293 (1967), the court suggested 
certain questions be considered in an 
evaluation of the totality of the circum-
stances in an identification procedure. 
First, was there justification for using 
the procedure; was there a necessity for 
using the type of identification employed; 
were the circumstances of an urgent character? 
Second, under the circumstances was there a 
chance that the procedure utilized would lead 
to misidentification? The court mentioned 
factors such as the opportunity and length 
of time that the witness had to observe the 
accused, the period of time of the incident 
to the identification, i.e. was the memory 
still fresh? 
501 P.2d at 1084, 1087. 
A year later, in State v. Volberding, 30 Utah 2d 
257, 516 P.2d 359 (1973), this Court was again confronted 
with an appeal based upon an allegedly improper in-court 
identification. The defendant was convicted of petty 
larceny after taking money from a bar. The bartender and 
his wife, after seeing the defendant for about one hour 
when the crime was coffiiTlitted, picked his photograph from 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a group of six to eight the following day while their 
memoriea1>1Were still fresh. Again looking to the totality 
of the circumstances, the court held that the identification 
procedure was permissible. 
In the most recent United States Supreme Court 
decision on this issue, Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 u.s. 98 
(1977), the Court reaffirmed Stovall in holding that the 
in-court identification of defendant by an undercover 
officer did not violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment even though the trial was held eight 
months after the initial photo identification. The court 
in its analysis applied the following tests to the facts 
of the case: (1) the opportunity to view, (2) the degree 
of attention, (3) the accuracy of the description, (4) 
the witness's level of certainty, and (5) the time between 
the crime and the confrontation. 
Applying this analysis to the case at bar: first, 
it was established that Mr. Harper had a two to three minute 
conversation with appellant and that appellant was in the 
office between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. for about five minutes 
while the sun was still up (T.l5,16). At the ti~e the crime 
was committed, Harper had the opportunity to view appellant 
for another six to ten seconds in the bright lights of the 
station (T.l7,35). This was enough time to form a mental 
impression of appellant. 
-12-
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Second, Harper testified that he likes to study 
people in his job and notices their appearances (T.37). 
This is a much greater level of attention to appearance 
than most people observe. Third, even though Mr. Harper 
had been struck on the head, he was abl.e to give a 
complete and accurate description of the appellant soon 
after the attack (T.64,65). He never wavered from that 
description through the time of trial. Fourth, Mr. Harper, 
though he carefully deliberated over the photos presented 
to him, had no trouble selecting that of appellant (T.22). 
He further testified that there was no doubt in his mind 
that appellant was the assailant (T.48). Fifth, the 
actual photo identification was made within ten to twelve 
hours after the crime occurred, while Hr. Harper's memory 
was still fresh. This was about the same amount of time as 
that approved in Simmons and Volberding, cited above. Looking 
to the totality of the circumstances, the identification 
process in this case was permissible. 
As to appellant's specific challenge to the fact 
that the photograph identification was influenced unduly by 
his construction of the composite drawing, the procedure used 
here was that which is accepted as the standard. The witness 
-13-
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constructs the composite from his memory which may or 
may not aid in choosing from photographs. In this case, 
Harper testified that it had not been used by him at 
all in picking appellant's photo from the group (T.41). 
As Mr. Schumacher pointed out in his closing arguments 
for the defense, the composite drawing did not resemble 
appellant very closely (T.l71). 
~here were no external, suggestive elements in 
the identification procedure used in this case which made 
it all but inevitable that Jared Harper would identify 
the appellant as his assailant, State v. Wettstein, supra. 
The composite drawing was the product of Harper's memory, 
which was not influenced by any suggestive conduct by the 
officers involved in the identification procedure (T.57, 
59). Even if Harper had used the composite drawing in 
making the photo identification, such use would not be 
impermissible unless some external, suggestive influence 
tainted his identification. 
In the absence of some showing of an external, 
suggestive influence upon Jared Harper's memory which 
effected him during the identification procedure, appellant's 
argument that the composite drawing impermissibly tainted 
the photo identification by making it inevitable that Harper 
would choose appellant's photo, fails to meet the high burden 
established by the United States Supreme Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
-14-
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POINT IIJ. 
THE ADMISSION OF A PHOTOCOPY OF THE 
COMPOSITE DRAWING IN EVIDENCE DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE "BEST EVIDENCE RULE" AND EVEN 
IF IT DID, ITS ADMISSION WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL 
AND nvES NOT MERIT REVERSAL. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 70, provides: 
(1) As tending to prove the 
content of a writing, no evidence 
other than the writing itself is 
admissible, except as otherwise 
provided in these rules, unless 
the judge finds (a)that the writing 
is lost or has been destroyed without 
fraudulent intent on the part of the 
proponent, . • . 
(2) If the judge makes one of the 
findings specified in the preceding 
paragraph, secondary evidence of 
the content of the writing is 
admissible. 
This is a sta+.ement of what is commonly referred to as the 
"best evidence rule." The purpose of the rule is, " .•• 
to secure the most reliable information as to the contents of 
documents, when those terms are disputed." McCormick on 
Evidence, 2nd Ed. (1972) p. 578. Appellant complains that 
the admission of a photocopy of the composite drawing made by 
Mr. Harper violates this rule and justifies reversal. The 
original of the composite drawing was disassembled for use in 
other cases (T. 58). 
The trial court admitted the photocopy after it was 
authenticated by both Mr. Harper and Officer Berhow over 
objection of defense counsel (T. 77). Defense counsel did 
-15-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not dispute the authenticity of the photocopy, nor that it 
had not been tampered with, hut only ~ected to its quality. 
(T. 72-74). Further, defense coun~Ql rejected the court's 
proposal that the state reconstruct the compo-.:ite (T. 77). 
Thus, the trial court found that the photocopy was the 
best available evidence and that the destruction of the 
original was not done with fraudulent intent. It appears 
from this that the situation here falls squarely within the 
exception found in Rule 70(1) (a) as cited above and that 
secondary evidence was admissible. 
Even if this Court finds the admission of the 
photocopy violated the best evidence rule, its admission did 
not prejudice the substantive rights of appellant and thus 
does not justify reversal of the conviction. Section 77-42-1, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, provides that: 
After hearing an appeal the court 
must give judgment without regard to 
errors or defects which do not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties. 
If error has been committed, it shall 
not be presumed to have resulted in 
prejudice. The court must be satisfied 
that it has that effect before it is 
warranted in reversing the judgment. 
If the identification of appellant in this case 
had been based solely on the composite drawing, appellant's 
contention that the quality of the photocopy was objectionable 
-16-
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might have shown prejudicial error in its admission. However, 
the identification was based primarily on the photo-
identification and in-court identification of appellant, and 
it is extremely unlikely that the jury verdict would have 
be'en different solely because they were able to view the 
original as opposed to a photocopy of the composite drawing. 
Further, the burden on law enforcement officials to preserve 
each original composite would necessitate an unlimited 
supply of replacement parts for each composite kit. This 
would present an unreasonable burden upon the process and 
would virtually assure that composites would never be used 
in evidence. 
POINT IV. 
A WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS DOES NOT LIE ON THE 
GROUND OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHERE 
SUCH EVIDENCE IS MERELY CUMULATIVE AND 
COULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED IN THE EXERCISE OF 
DUE DILIGENCE. 
After this appeal was taken, appellant petitioned 
in the lower court for a writ of coram nobis on the ground 
that he had receP-tly discovered a new witness who could 
corroborate the defense of alibi presented at trial. The 
witness, Jane Elsmore was the grandmother of Jim Hindley, 
who allegedly would have testified that she observed 
appellant and Mitch Powell at her house on the night of June 
29, 1978. For the reasons stated below, a writ of coram 
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nobis should not be issued in a situation such as this, and 
the trial court did not err in ruling that the petition did 
not allege facts legally sufficient to justify the issuance 
of such a writ. 
In the case of State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 143, 514 
P.2d 809 (1973), this Court dealt with the question of 
when a writ of coram nobis is properly issued. The defendant 
in that case was convicted of first-degree murder and later 
petitioned for a writ of coram nobis on the ground that a 
juror had seen a picture of the victim of the murder in his 
coffin during a recess of the trial. The trial court denied 
the petition, and the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the 
writ of coram nobis is a common law remedy which is only 
available where the defendant is wholly without other remedy. 
In Gee, the writ was properly denied because the defendant 
could have moved for a new trial under Section 77-38-3(2), 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. The Court added another 
reason that the writ could not issue and established the 
test which a petitioner must meet: 
There is an additional reason that 
the writ may not issue: it would not 
have been available at common law, for 
coram nobis was to correct an error of 
fact. It neither issues to correct an 
error of law nor to redress an irregularity 
occurring at trial, such as misconduct of 
the jury, court, or officer of the court, 
except under circumstances amounting to 
extrinsic fraud, which in effect deprived 
the petitioner of a trial on the merits. 
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The writ will be issued only where 
it clearly appears that the 
petitioner had a valid defense in 
the facts of the case, which, 
without negligence on his part, 
was not made because of duress, 
fraud, or excusable mistake, or he 
was prevented from asserting or 
enjoying some legal right through 
duress or fraud or excus&ble neglect; 
and these facts, not appearing on 
the face of the record, if timely 
known, would have prevented the 
rendition and entry of judgment. 
514 P.2d 809, 811 (emphasis added). 
In the case of Sullivan v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 
448 P.2d 907 (1968), this Court affirmed the rejection of 
a petition for a writ of coram nobis on the ground of facts 
allegedly discovered after the conviction which might have 
changed the defendant's guilty plea. The Court found that 
such facts were known to the defendant at the time of 
trial. Concerning the nature and burden of proof in coram 
nobis proceedings, the Court wrote: 
Petitions in habeas corpus and 
coram nobis are generally regarded 
as being analagous procedurally to 
civil proceedings. The petitioner 
has the burden of persuading the 
trial court by a preponderance of evidence 
facts which will entitle him to 
relief. 
448 P.2d 907, 910. 
The "mistake of facts" which appellant contends 
should entitle him to relief by issuance of a writ of 
coram nobis is the alleged newly discovered witness whose 
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testimony allegedly could not have been produced at trial. 
In Butt v. Graham, 6 Utah 2d 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957), 
this Court considered whether allegedly newly discovered 
evidence could support the issuance of a writ of coram nobis. 
In ~, the defendant was convicted of the crime of 
"carnal knowledge" and later petitioned for a writ of 
coram nobis on the ground that the district attorney suppressed 
evidence which would have shown that no intercourse took 
place. The Court found that the defendant knew of such 
evidence during the trial and thus that the trial court did 
not err in denying the petition. 
This Court has not directly confronted the question 
of whether or not a writ of coram nobis may lie based solely 
upon allegedly newly discovered evidence. However, several 
other jurisdictions have been presented with the question. 
The statement of the Tennessee Court in Johnson v. Russell, 
404 S.W. 2d 471 (Tenn. 1966), that: 
A writ of error coram nobis will 
ordinarily not lie to uermit the 
review of a judgment for subsequently 
or newly discovered evidence relating 
to matters which have been litigated at 
the trial. 
404 s.w. 2d 471, 474. 
is representative of the weight of authority. See also 
Gross v. State, 412 S.W. 2d 279 (Ark. 1967); Hatfield v. 
State, 529 S.W. 2d 180 (Mo. App. 1975); Divine v. State, 
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234 So. 2d 28 (Ala. 1970); People v. Wade, 366 N.E. 2d 528 
(Ill. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Ditmore, 363 A.2d 1253 
(Pa. Super, 1976); Dobie v. Commonwealth, 96 S.E. 2d 747 
(Va. 1957). These cases most often involve allegedly newly 
discovered evidence which was either cumulative to that 
offered at trial or ,.,.hich could have been discovered in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence before trial. 
Applying the test formulated in the Gee case 
to the case at bar, appellant must show that the failure to 
discover that Jane Elsmore had observed him on the night 
of the crime was not due to his own negligence, that the 
testimony which would have been offered by Jane Elsmore would 
have given him a "valid defense in the facts of the case," 
Gee, supra, and that the testimony of Jane Elsmore would have 
prevented the rendition of judgment against him. Appellant 
has not alleged facts sufficient to meet this burden, and 
thus the trial court properly denied his petition for a 
writ of coram nobis. 
Appellan~ ~ad a full opportunity to make his 
defense of alibi at the trial. The addition of any 
testimony offered by Jane Elsmore would have been merely 
cumulative to the evidence appellant presented. Such 
testimony would not have prevented the entry and rendition 
of judgment against appellant unless (1) the jury would 
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have been compelled to believe the testimony, and, (2) 
the testimony would have perfected appellant's defense 
of alibi. 
The jury would not have been compelled to believe 
the testimony of Jane Elsmore, but would have weighed such 
evidence against the testimony of other witnesses. Appellant 
testified that when he and Mitch Powell went to Mrs. Elsmore's 
house to pick up Jim Hindley, appellant remained in the 
car (T. 131). Jane Elsmore apparently was on her back 
porch at the time (appellant's Brief, p. 14), which makes 
it unlikely that she could have personally_ observed the 
appellant. 
Even if the jury might have believed the testimony 
which Jane Elsmore would have presented, (see affidavit of 
Jane Elsmore in Supp. Record), it would not have made 
appellant's alibi defense "valid." The crucial times which 
apply to appellant's alibi defense are (1) 8:00 to 8:30p.m., 
when the perpetrator appeared at the service station for the 
first time (T. 15), and (2) 9:55 to 10:00 p.m., when he 
returned to the station and the crime occurred. Jane Elsmore 
observed appellant at about 9:30 p.m. according to the 
testimony of both appellant (T. 131) and Mitch Powell (T. lll), 
and could have observed him only until about 9:35 (T. lll). 
In her affidavit she claims to have seen appellant at 
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10:00 p.m. (See supplemental record). Any testimony given 
by her would not prove, even if belie;·:ed, that appellant 
was not present at the service statio~ at either or both of 
the crucial times. Such testimony wo~ld not have prevented 
the jury from returning a verdict of guilty. 
Finally, the failure to dis~over that Jane 
Elsmore had observed appellant on the evening of the crime 
was due to appellant's negligence. R:asonable diligence 
should have suggested to appellant anj his counsel that if 
Jane Elsmore resided at a place where appellant allegedly 
was on that evening, inquiry should h~ve been made to 
determine whether or not she observed the appellant. 
Although Jane Elsmore was apparently in Florida at the time 
of appellant's preparation for trial, due diligence in 
contacting family members of Jim Hind:ey could have disclosed 
her location and she could have been served with a subpoena 
for trial. Alternatively, her deposi~ion could have been 
taken for use at trial. All of this shows a lack of 
"excusable" neglect in appellant's fa!lure to produce the 
facts which he alleges justify a new ~rial before the court. 
Thus, the trial court did not err in jenying the ?etition 
for a writ of coram nobis. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above-cited authority and argument, 
respondent prays that this Court affirm the conviction of 
the appellant and the denial of a petition for writ of 
coram nobis. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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